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MANUEL R. GARCIA-MORA
1921 - 1965
It is with great respect and sadness that we dedicate this issue
of the FORDHA.M LAW REVIEW to Professor Manuel R. Garcia-
Mora: teacher, author, scholar and friend.
3n Apmariarn
The untimely demise of Professor lanuel Garcia-Mora was
a disheartening loss to his family, his friends, members of his
profession, and to everyone at Fordham Law School. Although
he was a member of the faculty for only a few short years, his
cheerfulness quickly and firmly endeared him to the student
body. Through his teaching his students learned-for this we
are indebted to him; through his teaching he also learned-
for this we admired him.
Much of his time both in and out of the classroom was de-
voted to the fields of international and comparative law. His
books and many contributions to law reviews are an invaluable
contribution to those areas of jurisprudence.
He was a man who felt strongly and sincerely about funda-
mental concepts, constantly searching for truth and justice and
peace in what he wrote, taught and did.
It is indeed unfortunate that in the academic world, recogni-
tion and acclaim are reserved for so few and come so late in
life, for they surely would have come to this man.
THE EDITORS

THE ETHICAL FOUNDATION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITYt
EMILIO S. BINAVINCE "
I. INTRODUCTION
if STORY has demonstrated the need to articulate an adequate founda-
tion of criminal liability in criminal law reforms. The tragic experi-
ence of the German people during the Third Reich proved to be a lesson to
the criminal law scholars who prepared the new Draft Penal Code now be-
fore the Bundestag. The Draft Code is firmly committed to the funda-
mental principle that liability is based on personal guilt.' The code com-
mission believes that: "The concept of guilt is a living concept in a people.
Without it there cannot be a life directed to moral value conceptions.
Without moral value conceptions, however, human life is not possible."'
In England and the United States, the considerable extension of the doc-
trine of strict liability is posing a serious threat to the rational foundation
of criminal liability-the same threat that prevailed to reduce penalty in
Hitler's Germany into a morally indifferent "security measure," and
made millions of innocent people "criminals." Unfortunately, the Amer-
ican Law Institute failed to meet the challenge to articulate and accom-
modate a definite theoretical orientation in the Model Penal CodeY In the
main, the reason is that the issue involved is not dearly understood and its
t The r-search for this article was in part carried out during my term as Research Fellow
of the Ale-ander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung at the RechtsphilosophLsches Seminar, University
of Bonn, Germany in 1962-1963. I must express my appreciation to the Stiftung for -pon-
soring this and other works in Germany, and to Professor Hans Welzel, Director of the
Rechtsphilosophisches Seminar for his friendly assistance on my work on comparative
criminal law.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of Puerto Rico.
1. See Entwurf elnes Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) mit Begrindung §§ 15, 23, 24 (1962).
The Begriindung (motive) of the Entwurf says: "The draft is a criminal law based on
guilt (Schuldstrafrecht). This means that the penalty, an institution which contains a Judg-
ment of moral disvalue towards human conduct and has always been fundamentally so
considered, may be imposed only if the actor could be blamed for his act. To punish with-
out such reproach of blame would distort the idea of penalty and transforms it to a
morally colorless measure which could be abused for political purposes." Id. at 96. (Writer's
transl.)
2. Ibid. (Writer's transl.)
3. The Institute points out that the "abrogation of such liability may be impolitic ....
It believes that "reducing strict liability offenses to the grade of violations," aLo a criminal
behaviour, is the right solution. Model Penal Code § L05, comment 3 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1954). It left to the states the regulation of these offenses. Model Penal Code § 1.04,
Reporter's Note S (Off. Draft 1962).
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implications in the criminal law system sufficiently appreciated. To throw
a new light upon this problem, it might be useful to review the historical
development of the ethical foundation of criminal liability in the Anglo-
American law.
To a great degree, the theoretical foundation of liability in the Anglo-
American criminal law is a reflection of the uncertain and fragmentary de-
velopments in cultural history. Notwithstanding the classical works of
Hale, Hawkins, Coke and Blackstone, the scientific systematization of the
criminal law has not received sufficient attention comparable to the efforts
in continental Europe.4 This is in part attributable to the jural method of
the common law as a system. The particularistic language of common-law
legislation; the judicial attitude to deny a projective value to legislation
and its corollary doctrine of restrictive interpretation of laws affecting the
common law; the judicial method of reasoning by analogy from prior de-
cisions; the piecemeal judicial law making; the timidity of scholarship, ex-
cept in recent years, to generalize, organize and systematize the criminal
law into a consistent and logical unity-all these have, in one way or an-
other, inhibited the conscious and deliberate construction of a theoretically
defensible and adequate criminal law system. To refer to just one exam-
ple, we may mention the failure to isolate tort from criminal liability on
the basis of relevant distinction and classification. Proposed distinctions
are not without obscurity, and there is conduct that continues to be
classified as tort and crime, such as battery, assault and false imprison-
ment. This "viscous intermixture," as Winfield calls it,5 is archaic, and
has been maintained in the criminal law by the historical method of as-
certaining "the law." As long as archaic elements are suffered in criminal
law, no attempt to generalize and isolate crime from tort would be suc-
cessful.
II. THE ANCIENT POSTULATE OF LIABILITY
It is now common to refer the earliest beginning of criminal law to the
principle of vengeance. 6 In Roman law, private vengeance vanished at a
very early date.' In a culturally primitive society, physical force was the
immediate and simplest instrument of redress of what was then narrowly
4. There is truth in the words of Gustav Radbruch that the common law "has stumbled
its way to wisdom." Der Geist des englischen Rechts 64-68 (4th ed. 1958).
5. Winfield, The Province of the Law of Tort 190 (1931).
6. See K6hler, Zur Lehre von der Blutrache (1885) ; 1 Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschlchte;
ein Lehrbuch 46-52 (2d ed. 1962).
7. See Lffler, Schuldformen des Strafrechts (1895); Mommsen, Rbimisches Strafrecht
58-64 (1899); von Bar, History of Continental Criminal Law 11 (6 Continental Legal
History Series 1916).
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defined as wrong.s Crime was not considered a challenge against the col-
lective security, but an injury to the private peace of a family or clan. The
social unit was primarily organized for the purpose of protection against
an essentially external aggression.
This crude social structure formulated vague rules which can hardly
be contrasted with the sophisticated system of modern criminal law. It was
not until the private and public participation of the individual in society
was dearly delineated that the technical discipline of criminal law really
became established. Gradually, however, as the consciousness for com-
munal peace and security developed, the private prosecution of wrongs
began to move to the background. Vengeance became a serious interfer-
ence with peace, rather than, as it was in the past, the instrument of peace.
Nevertheless, the concept of penalty as understood in rational criminal
law was not known. Today penalty is considered a reaction of the state ex-
pressing an ethically negative judgment over the conduct and the actor.
The "penalty" of the ancient law was an instrument of mystical character
often related to religion.' Recent studies have shown that until the late
middle ages western Europe did not have any rational conception of pen-
alty.1" The word "penalty" or "Strafe" appeared for the first time in the
laws of the fourteenth century." To attribute to a sanction an element of
"penalty" requires a higher degree of cultural thought in which the crea-
tive nature of the human conduct is clearly defined. At this time, however,
the creative faculty of the human will had not been recognized; it was not
realized that man has the faculty to alienate himself from his natural cir-
cumstances and affect the natural order of things. On the contrary, man
was considered an indistinct part of the natural universe, behaving like
other natural objects, under the determined rule of necessity. Further, the
ancient mind had not formulated a satisfactory conception of the causality
of nature and the role of human conduct in the daily changes of given nat-
ural circumstances. The human conduct is the initial contact in the at-
tempts of man to intervene in the order of the world of causality. This was
obscure in their thinking, and they failed to appreciate that man is not ab-
solutely subject to nature, and that within a significant wide sphere of
possibilities, causality is a subservient agency that the human creative fac-
ulty dominates and utilizes. Again, a knowledge of the causality of the uni-
verse is a rational consciousness which is too subtle for an untrained mind
to speculate. They lacked, therefore, this essential presupposition from
S. For an exhaustive historical study of different national criminal laws, -ee Liiiler, op.
cit. supra note 7.
9. See Weissweiler, Busse (1930).
10. See Achter, Geburt der Strafe (1951).
11. 1 Conrad, op. cit. supra note 6, at 50-52.
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which the ethical evaluation of human behaviour could be drawn and the
concept of responsibility of the actor could be determined.
Before the Norman conquest, the Anglo-Saxon law can be found at this
stage of development. However, on the eve of the conquest we find that
blood feud was being regulated, and the composition system was in prac-
tice. The tariffs of wer, wite and bot-compositions to buy the peace of
the family and the king-can be found. They were already in the period
of some form of diffused transition. Cnut had already a more or less com-
prehensive catalogue of pleas of the crown as shown by a passage in the
Domesday Book. 2 It continued in use well into the reigns of the early
Norman kings.'" In the twelfth century, however, this elaborate system
suddenly disappeared. There were few crimes broadly defined within the
king's mercy; discretionary money penalties took the place of the wite,
and the bot became "damages" assessed by the court.' 4
In this period,' 5 liability, civil or criminal, attached to a materialistic
or objective hypothesis. There must be an external and material conduct
and injury on which liability could be grounded. The primitive mind was
utterly incapable of elevating itself from its immediate and perceptible
encompassment. It lacked the necessary speculative bent to investigate
the relevant and distinctive concepts beyond the material and visible in-
dications of a wrong. A wrong must be represented by an actual corporeal
injury. For instance, in the individual crimes the penalty imposed was
measured according to the value of the object damaged or injured. In theft
the gravity of the offense is determined by the value of the property stolen;
in battery, the penalty was made dependent upon the part of the body in-
jured.
The presence of a guilty mind was not a condition of liability during
the Germanic era.' This was tersely expressed in the rhythmic preface of
12. 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 43-47 (3d ed., rewritten 1927) (herein-
after cited as Holdsworthl; 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 451-54 (2d ed.
1927) [hereinafter cited as Pollock & Maitland].
13. 2 Holdsworth 47-50; 2 Pollock & Maitland 460-62.
14. 2 Pollock & Maitland 458-59.
15. To give the length of each period is to invite criticism. After all, the history of
ideas, unlike the occurrence of events, has an element of continuity that cannot be arbitrarily
encompassed in a defined span of time. Flexibility must be assumed, and it is prudent to
refrain, aside from indicating broad guides, from giving the length of each period hero
discussed.
16. This is the weight of authority. In Germany, this view is supported by Brunner,
Schwerin-Thieme, Planitz, Schrbder-Kunssberg, Eberhard Schmidt and others; the op-
posite view is represented by Amira, von Bar, Binding and Kaufmann. For a review, see
Kaufmann, Die Erfolgshaftung 11-16 (1958). Maitland, Holdsworth and Wigmore follow
Brunner closely, whereas Holmes, Plucknett and Winfield represent the contrary view.
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the SachsenspiegelJ 7 in Saxony. This work of Eike von Repkow reflects
also the thinking in England when it was written in the early years of the
thirteenth century. The lines, "The deed kills the man," and "One cannot
see a wrongful resolution, unless the deed is with it," indicate the objec-
tive character of the hypothesis of liability.' The Germanic law, however,
seems to distinguish some typified circumstances which would already in-
dicate that some type of conduct is not criminal, or at least, less blame-
worthy. In these cases, apparently the actor has no guilty mind, or when
not totally wanting, at least deserving of mitigation. But in these special
cases in which absolution or mitigation is recognized, the actor must make
an open oath that he did not initiate any circumstance connected with the
injury."2 If one has apparently contributed in any conceivable manner to
the death of another, he must take the open oath to a formula which was
still in use until the thirteenth century, that is, that he had done nothing
in which the dead man "was nearer to death or further from life.""0 Con-
duct which was not an offense could be made the ground of an appeal of
homicide if it could be shown that the conduct conduced, however indi-
rectly, to the death of the deceased.2' We see also that the ancient law has
a strong reproach against offenses done with secrecy (Mcinwerke). A
murder was considered a secret killing, and since the right of feud cannot
be easily pursued, it was heavily penalized. So also was theft more se-
verely penalized than robbery, a position which is exactly opposite the
approach of modern law which makes a distinction based on the absence
or presence of violence.
We can see the operation of this principle concretely if we investigate
the early doctrines on some of the familiar defenses in modern criminal
law. Under the old law accidental injury2- and injury done under coercion
or self-defense2 were equally sources of liability as an intentional and
blameworthy harmdoing.2 ' Brunner, a leading German legal historian,
says: "The early law knows no such thing as accident, but it seeks always
after something to make answerable, and determines it, by a scarcely ap-
For a short discussion, see Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 463-65 (5th
ed. 1956).
17. For a short account of the history of this famous legal literature tee 1 Conrad, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 351-52. In Germany, this is equivalent to Glanville's work.
1. Sachsenspiegel, Reiravorrede 27 (Eckhardt ed. 1955-1956). (Writer's tran-i.)
19. Planitz, Germanische Rechtsgeschichte 37 (1944).
20. 2 Holdsworth 52; 2 Pollock & Maitland 470.
21. Ibid.
22. Brunner, Vber absichtslose DAissethat im altdeutschen Strafrechte (lS90); 1 Brunner,
Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 211-20 (2d ed. 1923); 2 id. at 704; Wigmore, Reponsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 319-25 (1.94).
23. 1 Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 223 (2d ed. 192S).
24. Brunner, tVber absichtslose Missethat im altdeutschen Strafrechte 2-3 (1990).
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preciable causal nexus, from the condition of the harmful result.'" 5 The
Anglo-Saxon story of Beowulf provides an illustration of accidental injury.
Haedcyn, the second son of King Hredel, was accidentally killed by his
brother when the slayer's arrow did not hit its intended mark. The slayer
was held and killed to expiate the accidental death. The king so deeply
mourned the death of his two sons that he took his own life.20 As late as
1214 we can still feel the force of this Anglo-Saxon rule. In a case before
the king's court, one Roger of Stanton happened to kill a girl by misad-
venture while throwing a stone. "And it is testified that this was not by
felony. And this was shown to the king, and the king moved by pity
pardoned him the death. '2 7
A famous Nordic legend will suggest to us the doctrine of coercion in
the early law. The mistletoe twig was the only thing not sworn not to harm
the god Baldur. The jealous Loki gave the mistletoe to the blind god
Hodur, and, guiding his hands, threw the twig at Baldur from which he
died. The Germanic conception of liability makes the blind god Hodur
liable of a grave offense which was avenged by the brother of the de-
ceased. 8
The doctrine of self-defense under the old law seems to show that self-
defense is not as self-evident as is generally assumed. If we look at the old
doctrines, we will find to our surprise that the "natural tendency of all liv-
ing beings to self-preservation" is not axiomatic, as it is represented. The
old law does not exculpate a defendant because of self-defense; he and his
family were held liable to answer in a feud.29 Bracton relates a case where
the defendant answers, even in defense of himself against a burglar in his
own house.30 Two interesting cases were also decided in the early part of
the eleventh century which compel us to conclude that self-defense was
not wholly established until some later time. Robert of Herthale was re-
ported to have been arrested for having slain one Roger in self-defense.
Roger, it was shown, had also slain five men in the fit of madness. It was
directed that Robert be committed to the sheriff and the king was consulted
about the matter."' In the other case, a carter was assaulted by a rob-
ber, Howel, and his band in an attempt to rob him. The carter killed
Howel and defended himself against the others. It was ruled: "Whereas it
is testified that Howel was a robber, let the carter go quit thereof. And
25. 2 Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 707 (2d ed. 1928). (Writer's transl.)
26. See Brunner, op. cit. supra note 24, at 2-3.
27. 1 Selden Society, Select Pleas of the Crown No. 114 (1887).
28. See 1 Conrad, op. cit. supra note 6, at 49.
29. See 1 Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 223 (2d ed. 1928).
30. 1 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angllae 446 (Twiss ed. 1879).
31. 1 Selden Society, Select Pleas of the Crown No. 70 (1887).
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note that he is in the parts of Jerusalem, but let him come back safely,
quit of that death."32
When it dawned upon the ancient law that the approach to accident and
self-defense was harsh, some light of rationalism began to enter the sys-
tem of criminal law. The king generally mitigated this harshness by using
his prerogative to pardon the defendant, as the foregoing cases have dem-
onstrated. But it is important to notice that justification was not as yet
recognized; hence, the defendant needs a pardon. In 1278, the Statute of
Gloucester33 directed the judges that if one kills another in self-defense
or by misadventure, he shall be held liable, but the judges shall inform the
king, so that the king may pardon him if he wills?
The lack of enlightened orientation to evaluate the subjective elements
of conduct may also be noted in the doctrines concerning the liability of
the insane and infants. Modern law recognizes insanity as a defense in
crime but not in tort." However, in ancient law, in which criminal and civil
liabilities were not distinguishable, the state of the law was different. In-
sanity does not entitle a man to be acquitted, at least not in murder. Insan-
ity merely enables him to obtain a special verdict that he committed the of-
fense while insane, and the king may extend his pardon 0 The modern law
holds a child liable in tort,37 and an age of immunity in criminal law has
been fixed at seven." Here the development was quite different from in-
sanity. In the Germanic tradition, until a male child becomes a weapon-
bearing member of the community, he does not have the capacity to pos-
sess rights nor assume liabilities. At a time when peace was precariously
32. Id. at No. 145.
33. 6 Edw. 1, c. 2 (1273).
34. See 3 Stephen, The History of the Criminal Law of England 36-37 (1033).
35. McGuire v. Almy, 297 Mass. 323, 3 N.E.2d 760 (1937).
36. See 2 Stephen, op. d. supra note 34, at 151.
37. Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
33. Clay v. State, 143 Fla. 204, 196 So. 462 (1940); Triplett v. State, 169 MiLs. 305,
152 So. 831 (1934); Queen v. Smith, [145] 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 260; 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries **22-24; 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 26 (Ist Am. ed. 1,47). Currently, we are
inclined to classify infants into several categories of reuponsibility. The age of immunity
varies in different jurisdictions usually from seven to eight years. See generally Wood-
bridge, Physical and Mental Infancy in the Criminal Law, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 426 (1939). In
England the age of immunity was raised from seven, as in the common law, to eight Sm
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 50. Next is the rebuttable
criminal fficapacity between the ages of eight to fourteen years. Miles v. State, 99 liss.
165, 54 So. 946 (1911). Above fourteen, the defense of infancy is usually no longer av-ail-
able. Children and Young Persons Act, supra at § 107; Woodbridge, supra at 433. In Zome
jurisdictions, a boy below the age of fourteen cannot be found guilty of rape or other
sexual offenses because of the conclusive presumption of physical immaturity. Tea Pen.
Code art. 118S (1961); 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *212. Compare Cal. Pen. Code § 262.
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achieved by arms, complete participation in the political and legal rights
and duties in the community was conditioned upon the capacity to bear
arms. Until the child attains this status, the father answered for and made
claims on behalf of the child like the master for his slave." The acquisi-
tion of this status is marked by a solemn ceremony, the Wehrhaftnack-
ung, in which the male child is given a weapon.40 The ceremony custom-
arily, though not always, took place at the age of twelve. Accordingly,
during the Anglo-Norman era the infant initially acquires liability at the
age of twelve,4' and the cases have ruled that a child cannot be guilty of a
crime until it reaches this age.42 Later, however, the law became severe,
and, apparently as a borrowing from Roman law, the tendency was to
limit the age of immunity to seven.43 A boy who killed another in defense
of his brother argued that he was below twelve years of age. Nevertheless,
he was committed to prison, and Judge Spigurnel said: "If he had done
the deed before his age of seven years, he should not suffer judgment; but
if... he had done any other deed not causing the loss of life or limb, and
against the peace, he should not answer, because before that age he is not
of the peace."" It was thereafter firmly established in the common law
that beyond the age of seven, the infant is doll capax.45
The development of the tort liability of a child departed from this pat-
39. Wigmore, supra note 22,.at 447. Wigmore points out that the same notion of legal
liability could be seen in one of the two forms of the writ of pardon for infants In the
Registrum Brevium where the infant was discharged, but must come up again and answer
if any one raises the question after he has arrived "ad legitimam aetatem." Id. at 447 n.2.
40. See 1 Conrad, op. cit. supra note 6, at 13-14.
41. Wigmore, supra note 22, at 447.
42. In a case, a boy placed a mark inside the house to shoot his arrow. In shooting, the
arrow accidentally went outside and killed a woman. A Justice said: "Since he Is not of the
age of twelve years, he is not a felon, but good and loyal." Y.B. 30-31 Edw. 1, 529 (Rolls
ed.) quoted in Wigmore, supra note 22, at 447 n.3; see also Kenny, Outlines of Criminal
Law 73 (Turner ed. 1952).
43. Wigmore, supra note 22, at 447 n.4; see also 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 38, at 20-23.
44. Y.B. 30 Edw. 1, 510-12 (1302) (Rolls ed.) quoted in Wigmore, supra note 22, at
447 n.4.
45. In Wooldale's Case (1218-1219), 56 Selden Society 415, pl. 1134 (1937), a seven
year old boy was held liable for murder but the death penalty was pardoned him for the
King's sake. In 1338, a girl of thirteen years was found guilty of treason for killing her
mistress. She was burnt. It was argued in this case that by the old law no one under ago
was hanged, or has ever suffered judgment of life or limb. Spigurnel, J., howdver, found
a case where a child of ten was hanged for killing his companion. It was said that because
the infant concealed the body of his companion after killing him, he knows the distinction
between evil and good. Y.B. 12 Edw. 3, 627 (1338) (Rolls ed.) quoted in Wigmore, supra
note 22, at 447 n.5. See also 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *23; 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 38,
at 26.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
tern." 'When the idea of compensation was gaining ascendance over the
penal idea in tort, the rule was that infants, like the insane, were liable for
damages they may have caused. About 1611, the courts started arguing a
distinction between tort and criminal liability in that in tort, unlike in
crime, the "intent" to cause damage was immaterial. "7
The doctrines of inchoate offenses, such as criminal attempt, solicita-
tion and conspiracy, in criminal law present to us another interesting area
of comparison between modern and ancient criminal law. As it shall ap-
pear, we will find that these recognized doctrines are not as modern as one
would believe. These offenses are not self-contained or adequate wrongs
because they do not connote any material injury in themselves. As rela-
tional and derivative offenses, their disvalue-quality requires an investi-
gation and evaluation of the mental orientation of the actor. There is no
attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, as such; one must always attempt,
solicit or conspire the commission of a specially defined offense such as
murder, robbery or treason. In order to establish the significance of a par-
ticular conduct as attempt, solicitation or conspiracy, it is necessary to as-
certain the relevance of the subjective orientation of the actor towards the
execution of these material offenses. It is not enough that a conduct ex-
isted, and that a concrete consequence is wanting. The mental nexus be-
tween the conduct and the unrealized consequence must be definitely es-
tablished. For this reason, a sharper consciousness of the concept of
"harm" as something incorporeal or inanimate is necessary to realize that
inchoate offenses deserve punishment. This was, however, unknown to the
ancient law, and accordingly what we consider now as criminal attempt,
solicitation and conspiracy were not sources of liability 9 Indeed, an at-
tempt to commit a crime was not dearly established as an offense at com-
mon law until 18O1. 41 But even at the establishment of the doctrine of at-
tempts, the corporeality of the concept of "harm" still held back for a time
the recognition of the doctrine of impossible attempt. The conviction of
the prisoner in Regina v. M'Phersondo was quashed because of the factual
46. A case in 1457 has always been given as the first case holding an infant liable in
trespass. See Wigmore, supra note 22, at 447-43 n.7. The child who caused the Iom of one
eye of the plaintiff was four years old. Wigmore believes that the court in this case was
still laboring under the penal idea in trespass, and that there was an inclination by the
court to exempt the child. Wigmore argues that the reason given for refusing to dkcharge
the child due to incapacity of discretion does not amount to a refusal to discharge on the
ground of immateriality of intention. Id. at 443.
47. Ibid.
48. 1 Brunner, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte 213 (2d ed. 192); His, Das Strafrccht der
Friesen im Mittelalter 76-S0 (1901).
49. King v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 11,01).
50. Dears. & B. 197, 169 Eng. Rep. 975 (Ct. Crim. App. 1S57).
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impossibility to complete the attempt to steal the article specified in the
indictment. This caution was strongly entertained in homicide. The fa-
mous Baron Bramwell skeptically said:
The argument that a man putting his hand into an empty pocket might be convicted of
attempting to steal, appeared to me at first plausible; but supposing a man, believing
a block of wood to be a man who was his deadly enemy, struck it a blow intending
to murder, could he be convicted of attempting to murder the man he took it to be?5 l
The ancient criminal law, however, knows some typified conducts as of-
fenses that are defined under modern criminal law as attempts. For exam-
ple, we can find during the Franken times a catalogue of independent
delictual attempts. However, it must be noted that the ancient law con-
sidered only the realization of external circumstances, not the direction of
the will of the actor.2 Thus, the ancient law considers as punishable con-
duct: the giving of poison, the drawing of a sword, or dipping of another
in water, which are the modern equivalent of attempted homicide, or as-
sault and battery; the entry into the land of another, a modern equivalent
of attempted burglary; the getting on the bed of a third person, a rough
equivalent of attempted rape or adultery 3 In all these cases casuism is
the determinative element; the ancient law does not care to examine why
one has drawn a sword, or entered the land of another, or was on the bed
of a third person. The moment such circumstances are present, there ex-
isted a completed offense.
The concept of conduct was also viewed by the old law with sharp ma-
terialism. It only imposes liability when the offender has pursued an active
and perceptible bodily behaviour; but when one has made a positive bod-
ily movement, he acts at his own peril. 4 This seems still to be the rule at
the time of Hale: "[I] t cannot come under the judgment of felony, be-
cause no external act of violence was offered, whereof the common law can
take notice, and secret things belong to God . . . ,, The movement of
the mouth in speech seems too negligible to be considered a conduct. For
example, the common law has held until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
51. Regina v. Collins, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 497, 498, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (Ct. Crim. App.
1864). He voted to quash the conviction. Pollock, C.B., in Regina v. Gaylor, Dears. & B.
288, 292, 7 Cox Cr. Cas. 253, 255, 169 Eng. Rep. 1011, 1012 (Ct. Crim. App. 1857), pointedly
said: "If I, believing that there is a person in an adjoining room, when in fact there Is no
one there, fire a pistol through the doorway with the intention of killing him, I have
committed no act cognizable by the criminal law, although, morally, I am just as guilty
as if I had shot the man." See also 2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 34, at 225. Cf. Regina
v. Brown, 24 Q.B.D. 357 (1889).
52. 1 Conrad, op. cit. supra note 6, at 173.
53. Ibid.
54. 2 Holdsworth 51.
55. 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 38, at 429. He was speaking of witchcraft.
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tury that a person who causes the death of another by fright or shock is
not guilty of homicide50 It was not until Stephen had supported the con-
trary view that this objectivity was gradually abandoned. 7
The continuity of this idea seems still to be noticeable in the doctrine of
omission. In continental Europe, it is now firmly recognized that a failure
to render assistance to persons in emergency, when such aid or assistance
could be rendered without danger to the actor, is a crime.S In the common
law, there has been a persistent refusal to recognize liability in omission,
either in tort or criminal law.rl The proposal of BenthamcO and his Amer-
ican disciple, Edward Livingston,0 ' to create liability based on omission
was rejected in preference to the established rule as supported by Lord
Mlacaulay 2 and Stephen.63 When the courts feel that punishment should
be imposed, especially in manslaughter, liability is justified with a hark-
ing argument upon negligence based on some "legal duty" which was omit-
ted.' This doctrine of the old law might also explain the late acceptance
of "possession" as a conduct.
It might appear to some observers that there was an attempt in the laws
of Alfred to create distinctions based on some mental attitudes. It was de-
creed that, "If a man have a spear over his shoulder, and any man stakes
himself upon it, that he pay the wer without the wite . . . ; if he be ac-
cused of wilfulness in the deed let him clear himself according to the wite;
and with that let the wite abate . ... "" Holdsworth says that no such
56. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (S Cush.) 295 (180); Regmina v. Murton,
[1S621 3 F. & F. 492, 176 Eng. Rep. 221; 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 38, at 428,
57. "Suppose a man kills a sick person intentionally by mahing a loud noise which .-mhes
him when sleep gives him a chance of life; or suppose knowing that a man has aneurism of
the heart, his heir rushes into his room, and roars in his ear 'Your wife is dead!' intending
to kill and killing him, why are not these acts murder? They are no more 'secret things
belonging to God' than the operation of arsenic .... If it was, and it was intended to have
that effect, why should it not be murder?" Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law 210 n.9 (9th
ed. 1950).
58. See e.g., German Penal Code § 330(c) (1371).
59. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mlich. 206, 113 N.W. 1123 (1907); The Queen v. Instan,
[1893] 1 Q.B. 450.
60. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 323 (1879).
61. The Draft Penal Code of Livingston proposed to penalize omison, but the Draft
Code was not adopted. See 2 Livingston, Complete Work on Criminal JurLprudence
126-27 (1873).
62. See Macaulay, Notes on the Indian Penal Code, in Lord Macaulay's Works 413
(Trevelyan ed. 1373).
63. 3 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 34, at 10.
64. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 193-94 (2d ed. 1960); Kenny, Outline
of Criminal Law 16-17 (Turner ed. 195S).
65. 2 Holdsworth 51 n.S.
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conclusion can really be drawn because it was not the ethical element in
conduct that was the foundation of liability but the external conduct it-
self causing the injury.66 This conclusion becomes doubly tenable if we
remember that modern criminal law theory does not consider the objective
presence of conduct alone as exclusively determinative in crime. Some de-
finitive qualification in terms of objective and subjective circumstances
must be adopted as references of evaluation. It must therefore be insisted
that the ancient law was not able to evaluate subjective elements. Its con-
ception of value was obviously material and referable only to the immedi-
ate senses of the empirical world. There are, of course, a number of be-
haviours in which the ancient mind could perceive the immediate
presence of injury in conduct alone. For example, cowardice, especially in
war, was punishable in the Germanic law. We must remember, however,
that in ancient society bravery was not only a virtue; the obligation to go
to war was more immediate and necessary. But cowardice in this context
does not necessarily connote an ethical evaluation. It would have been dif-
ficult for the ancient mind to know that the refusal to fight in war might
be based on some justifiable reason or conscientious rejection of killing
another. Indeed, as late as the end of the middle ages, we find Chief Justice
Brian saying: "The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil him-
self knoweth not the thought of man."6 7 These words, as Maitland rightly
described, "might well be the motto for the early history of criminal law."0 8
This objectivity, however, which we have found in the ancient criminal
law is also prevalent in other branches of the Anglo-American law. Many
well-known doctrines and principles in the modern law of property, suc-
cession, contracts and others reflect this curious materialism. They show
the strong continuity in the conceptions of the common-law system. With
the "romanization" of the continental legal systems, the Anglo-American
law is probably the most faithful heir of the Germanic tradition.
The rational significance of feud and the composition system in ancient
criminal law discloses the early theory of responsibility. The power to
punish in ancient society was in the clan or kinship. The head of the fam-
ily possessed a penal authority, but only within his family, and it was de-
rived from his paternal power. 9 If an outsider committed a wrong against
a member of the kinship, the feud-a private war between the clan of the
offender and the offended-was the result. The feud was a legally recog-
nized form of revenge. Damages done in pursuance of a feud were not
wrongs, and if the feud was successful, it restored the dignity of the offen-
66. Id. at 52-53.
67. Y.B. Pasch. 7 Edw. 4, f. 2, pl. 2 (1468).
68. 2 Pollock & Maitland 475.
69. 1 Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte; ein Lehrbuck 46-49 (2d ed. 1962).
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
ded clan. For this reason, to let the wrongdoer go free and accept a com-
position in expiation was not a favored practice. In homicide, the revenge
need not fall upon the wrongdoer himself; it was possible to seek out any-
one in the kinship. In the early Norwegian practice, we find the relatives
of the deceased making the best man of the offender's clan answer for the
wrong.70 When the composition system became popular, the wrong was
atoned with compensation. However, it remained the obligation of the kin-
ship to buy out the private war.
The liability is therefore assumed by the group. The imposition of lia-
bility presupposes responsibility of the group for the conduct that caused
the wrong. The pervading maxim behind the feud or composition system
is the theory of collective or joint responsibility of the kinship. Not the of-
fender alone, but the clan answers for his wrong. To the ancient mind,
conduct was not an individual determination, it was a result of group res-
olution. Hence, it was not possible to formulate a theory of responsibility
based on the moral and personal accountability of the actor. This theory
of responsibility was, of course, consistent with the position of the indi-
vidual in society at the time. The Germanic law has not sharply recognized
the individual personality. The legal position of the individual was deter-
mined by his membership in a clan; individual rights and duties were
wholly derivative; they were referable to the kinship. Any one who stands
outside the clan, for instance a foreigner, had neither rights nor protec-
tion.7'
III. THE SEARCH FOR SUBJECTE POSTULATES
During the reign of Henry I, we notice a formless struggle to sustain
liability on something more substantial than the physical appearances of
injury or conduct. The cultural stage of the people was beginning to open
the unknown regions of significant subjective concepts not easily and im-
mediately derivable from the materialistic evidences of an undesirable
consequence. To be sure, the rational foundations of criminal liability were
found only after a number of difficult experiments.72 The development
was not conscious and deliberate, nor marked with clear definition of de-
terminants and variables; to borrow the words of Maitland, it was pri-
marily a process of "blundering their way to wisdom."
The ancient law made the first successful attempt when it found a sbarp
contrast between absolute liability and intentional realization of harm. To
the medieval eye, absolute liability for all visible injuries dawned as an
unsatisfactory and harsh archaism. On the other hand, to impose liability
70. Id. at 47.
71. Id. at 31-39.
72. 2 Pollock & Maitland 475.
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only for harms intentionally realized seemed to them extremely revolu-
tionary, if not limited. That this contrast would be stumbled upon in the
medieval ages is explained by the theoretical structure of intention. In
criminal law theory, intention admits a more reasonably definite and easily
formulated theoretical articulation than other mental states. The impact
of its qualities is unequivocal from the material elements of wrong. The
elucidation of intention, however, was not conscious, and often we find it
vague and confused. Still, liability was not grounded on intention alone.
However, we can understand this hesitation of the ancient law if we note
that even modern Anglo-American criminal law does not refer its scheme
of criminal liability exclusively to intention. Negligent offenses and a num-
ber of variations of the old doctrine of versari in re illicita illustrate lia-
bility for unintended harms in modern law. Further, the ancient dooms-
men did not possess the elaborate machinery of punishment available to
the courts today. As Maitland pointed out, either "the doomsmen of old
days must exact the wer or let the slayer go quit.17 It would have ap-
peared to his obscure feeling for logic fallacious to impose a diminished
wer in cases of mitigated forms of culpability. 7 Nevertheless, this period
saw the emergence of a new justification for holding a man liable for his
wrong. Mental elements were examined to create a possible ethical basis
of liability. At this time, for instance, the Leges Henrici introduced to En-
lish law the maxim that puzzles modern criminal law scholars: "reum non
Jacit nisi mens rea."'75
The forces that stimulated the exploration of a new basis of liability
were numerous. There was a remarkable rise of the royal justice in the
king's peace, which resulted in the serious and more or less systematic
consideration of offenses. This was accompanied by the gradual develop-
ment of a more solid and precise organization of the political machinery.
Besides profits to the crown due to corruption of blood and forfeiture of
property when a felony is committed, the crown found it really necessary
to intervene for the preservation of the king's peace. The coercive sanc-
tion of criminal law was perceived as an appropriate instrument of effec-
tive regulation of the affairs of the kingdom. The number of unemendable
offenses was appreciably increased.76
The attention directed to the investigation of the mind and the ethical
implications of these elements in crime, however, is especially attributable
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. 2 Pollock & Maitland 476; See LUvitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17
fll. L. Rev. 117 (1922).
76. 2 Pollock & Maitland 460-62; 2 Holdsworth 47-50.
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to the influence of the Christian church.77 We see that the Christian
church, even before the Norman conquest, had been urging that the objec-
tive rules of liability which formed the Anglo-Saxon law of crime and tort
ought to be modified in accordance with the subtler conception of moral
culpability. 7 The church's conception of sin seems to have provided the
foundation of this novel experiment on liability. The point of departure of
the Christian religion was the existence of a creative element in the human
mind. Sin evaluates the purposive functioning of this element; it is there-
fore a moral concept definable in reference to the activity of the relevant
mental state. The sanctions following sin assume a personal moral respon-
sibility over the human conduct. These were embodied in the ecclesiastical
laws and poenitentiaries of the church, and the legal minds from Henry Is
reign found them ready sources of guidance in the development of criminal
law. In some cases, the medieval mind was inclined to exaggerate, and the
view seems to be that crime is nothing different from sin. They were so
closely drawn to the church, says Holdsworth, that to save the actor's soul,
not to prevent any blood feud was their primary concern."
In this period we notice also a remarkable change in the theory of re-
sponsibility. It seems inevitable since the theory of responsibility is but a
corollary of the ethical basis of liability. We have seen that the collective
and joint responsibility of kinship was the fundamental maxim of the prin-
ciple of vengeance. Now, however, we find the individual demanding a rec-
ognition of his personality separate from the group. Man, in other words,
was becoming an individual. Again, the dogma of the Christian church led
the way for the individualization of personality. Christianity is based on
the distinct individuality of man as a basic assumption of responsibility.
Salvation according to the Christian dogma is personal; each actor, de-
tached from his family or kin, stands accountable for his conduct. The
significance of this idea is the establishment of an individualistic basis of
responsibility in crime. The principle of vengeance was irreconcilably op-
posed to this trend of development; gradually, it became obsolete. Respon-
sibility shifted from kinship to the individual, from group liability to per-
sonal liability."s
The forceful current of the stream of novel conceptions also washed
away many of the harsh archaisms of the ancient law. The lunatic and the
infant were already free from criminal liability in the laws of Henry I,
77. See 2 Holdsworth 53; 2 Pollock & Maitland 476; LUvitt, supra note 75.
78. Plucknett, The Relations Between Roman Law and English Common Law Down to
the Sixteenth Century: A General Survey, 3 U. Toronto LJ. 24, 43 (1939).
79. 2 Holdsworth 53.
S0. "The sense of individualism in Christianity was opposed to the solidarity and joint
responsibility of the kindred." Seebohm, Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law 3S4-35 (1911).
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though it does not follow that the persons responsible for their custody
will entirely escape.8' But indicative of the experimental stage of this pe-
riod, the man who has killed another by misadventure or in self-defense is
still liable to pay the wer. The archaism of this rule seems to have dis-
turbed the thoughts of the author of the Leges Ilenrici 2 When such an
occasion arises it has been noticed that the king's pardon generally inter-
cedes.
Outside England, we find a new force developing at Bologna-the re-
vived Roman law that extinguished forever the national identity of the le-
gal systems of most countries in continental Europe. It was not unknown
to England; its influences are still found in many institutions of English
law, but was not able to prevail upon the existing common law. The re-
vived Roman law was edging its way into English law during the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries. The conduits of this "reception" were legal
minds, like Glanville and Bracton, and the Christian church. They began
to contrast, as Glanville did, civil and criminal cases, to speak of dolus
and culpa, and to find stress on the psychical elements in crime.83 Bracton's
De Legibus brought to England the Roman law principles restated in Azo's
Summa 4 and Bernardus Papiensis's Summa Decretalium.5 Important in
the theory of liability is Bracton's borrowing from Bernard. We must,
however, warn that his is not strictly Roman. Bracton's discussion on hom-
icide was transplanted from the doctrines worked out by the great canon-
ist, one of which is the fundamental doctrine adopted by judges in the
development of the troublesome constructive malice rule of modern crim-
inal law. It is certain that Roman law has always insisted on the sharp
separation of dolus and culpa. But this absolute reliance upon the assump-
tion of blameworthiness or guilt was obscured by the developments in the
middle ages. The church contributed its share to the confusion in formula-
ting the doctrine of versari in re illicita.8 Lbffler has convincingly demon-
strated that this doctrine was articulated for the first time in Bernard's
81. 2 Holdsworth 53.
82. Leges Regis Henrici Primi § 84, in Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of England
(1840). "Every outlaw is brother to another; and he who answers a fool according to his
folly is like unto him." Quoted in 2 Holdsworth 54.
83. 2 Pollock & Maitland 477.
84. See Select Passages From the Works of Maitland, Bracton and Azo (Maitland ed.
1895); Gilterbock, Henricus de Bracton (1860); 2 Holdsworth 236-37; Woodbine, The
Roman Element in Bracton, 31 Yale L.J. 782 (1922).
85. 2 Pollock & Maitland 477; Mannheim, Mens Rea in German and English Criminal
Law, 18 J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l L. 78 (3d ser. 1936).
86. For details, see Liffler, Schuldformen des Strafrechts 136-42 (1895); von Bar,
Gesetz und Schuld im Strafrecht 277 (1907) ; Mezger, Strafrecht, ein Lehrbuch 262 (1949).
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Summa which appeared between 1191 and 119S. 57 The idea of this doc-
trine is that liability does not only extend to the classical guilt in the forms
of dolus and culpa of Roman law, but that liability may be found for con-
sequences which are accidentally realized as a consequence of a prohibited
conduct. This notion was related to the principle of the church in cases of
religious irregularity that the unworthy should be excluded from the exer-
cise of ecclesiastical functions.-" The ethical standard of the church was
high; it demanded absolute moral innocence so that responsibility over
the injury should not be traced to any wrongful conduct of the actor. If a
man accidentally causes death because of a prohibited act, however remote
from the death, the actor is liable for the death. "Versanti in re illicita im-
putantwr omnia quae sequuntur ex delicto." From Bracton, English law
found this doctrine useful to impose liability upon persons not totally free
from contributing causal elements in the realization of the injury. It was
so useful that it is now so firmly established a principle in the common law
that attempts to abolish it have seen great difficulties.19
87. LUSffler, Schuldformen des Strafrechts 133-42 (IS95). Norval Morris says this
principle is derived from Roman law, but he cits no authority. Morris, The Felon's
Murder Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50, 58 n.43 (1956).
No evidence supports this assertion. 'Morris must have been misled by the Latin form of
this principle.
88. Mlezger, Strafrecht; ein Lehrbuch 262 n.1S (1949).
89. The English Homicide Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. II, §§ 1, 2, might convince
others to abolish the felony-murder rule. The purpose of the Homicide Act to abolsh the
constructive-malice rule, however, has been, to a great degree, frustrated by the House of
Lords in construing § 1 of the act. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith, (1,0] 3 All
E.R. 161. Section I requires "malice aforethought (epress or implied)" in murder. The
defendant in this case, while driving a car loaded with stolen goods, was stopped by the
deceased, a constable. The deceased noticed the goods, and asked the defendant to draw into
his near side. Defendant, in an attempt to escape from the constable, accelerated his car
along the street. The deceased, however, hung on the car. Smith attempted to -hake him off,
and after a distance, the deceased was thrown off the car, and was run over by another
car coming from the opposite direction. The defendant was charged of capital murder. The
Lords, through the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, admitted there was no "e.prEs
malice," but conviction for murder was sustained on the bads of "implied malice. The
Lords argued that malice could be found by using the test provided by Holmes. Holmes
believes that intention is an objective concept and means foresight of the consequence
ascertained from the viewpoint of a "reasonable man." Holmes, The Common Law 53-54
(1949). In this case "a reasonable man" could have foreseen the consequence of a grievous
bodily harm upon the deceased when he was shaken off the car, though Smith himself could
not have foreseen it.
The area of malice as understood by Holmes and the House of Lords is more limited
than the area of constructive malice. However, the effect of Smith is to restore the construc-
tive-malice rule in a signficant area where ordinarily negligence has been found. For criticizm
of Smith, see Binavince, The Theory of Negligent Offenses in Anglo-American Criminal Law,
33 Phil. L.J. 423, 469-72 (1963); Parker, The True Meaning of D.P.P. v. Smith?, 59 L.
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In the succeeding centuries, however, the influence of Roman and canon
law ebbed sharply. After the thirteenth century, they ceased to exercise
appreciable influence on the development of English law. 0 The work of
Bracton, after various peaks, waned in popularity in about 1350, not to be
rediscovered again until 1569."' But we do not need to go into the reasons
that made the common law able to resist the incursions of Roman law. We
need only mention that as a result of this development, the English law-
yers were thrown back upon themselves to work out doctrines and prin-
ciples of criminal law. Their work became also especially difficult because
responsive concepts appeared necessary to accommodate the complexities
of a rapidly developing society. 2
During the reign of Edward I, however, some general and rational prin-
ciples of criminal law were already authoritatively established. It was rec-
ognized that personal accountability is an essential presupposition of
criminal liability. For example, age was considered an element of personal
responsibility, and a child of tender age who committed a crime was
granted the benefit of excuse." We have seen that later a child under seven
cannot be guilty of a felony, but we find in the Register of Writs that at an
earlier time a pardon was granted to a child under the age of seven.0' It
was also laid down that insanity at the commission of the offense is a valid
defense. 5 During the reign of Edward III the external circumstances that
affect the freedom of determination of the actor's conduct were recognized
as a basis for further distinctions. If the actor is denied the freedom of de-
termination, he is sometimes granted the benefit of excuse. Thus, one com-
mitting offenses under duress in time of war or rebellion was excul-
pated.", We can also find in the Year Books of the regnal years of Edward
IV and Henry VII that a person can establish self-defense or misadventure
to escape liability for a felony, although he might be liable to a civil action
of trespass.97
Soc. Gasette 149 (1962); Travers & Morris, Imputed Intent in Murder or Smith v. Smyth,
35 Austl. L.J. 154 (1961); Williams, Constructive Malice Revived, 23 Modern L, Rev.
605 (1960).
Through the influence of natural law in the codifications in Europe, the principle of guilt
as a basis of liability was firmly established and in no time the doctrine of versarl In re
illicita which spread during the middle ages was gradually abandoned.
90. 2 Holdsworth 359, 452; 3 Holdsworth 371.
91. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 263 (5th ed. 1956),
92. 3 Holdsworth 371.
93. 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 20-29 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
94. 2 Holdsworth 358 n.8; 3 Holdsworth 372.
95. 3 Holdsworth 372.
96. 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 93, at 49.
97. 3 Holdsworth 313.
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IV. THE EMERGENCE OF ETHICAL Mens Rca
The trend of the preceding period was leading to a higher sophistication
in the analysis of crime, and the evaluation of subjective attitudes was the
point of departure. The repudiation by society of an offense was becoming
identified with the concept of punishment; a crime was more or less re-
garded as an embodiment of a challenge to the values accommodated by a
more or less integrated society. The disvalue element of a crime was mov-
ing gradually from the visible causation of a material harm or the execu-
tion of an outward behaviour into the ethical significance of the conduct.
Investigations of the psychological operations of the mind and its limita-
tion were unconsciously attempted. The more obvious limitations upon
free responsibility such as youth, insanity, coercion upon the wife by the
husband and like defenses were recognized. 3
An obvious defiance of social values is embodied in the "intent" to re-
alize an undesirable consequence. We found that this concept is relatively
easy to ascertain because of its active and positive relation with the harm.
Whereas a sharp contrast between absolute liability and liability founded
on intentional realization of harm was attempted in the earlier period, the
construction given now was that the essence of offenses is the "intent with
which the act was done." The judges were even inclined to be absurd, and
they usually went far in considering the "intent" for the deed. They pun-
ished the "intent" though the act was uncompleted 9 This doctrine was,
of course, radical and even dangerous, but it had a strong appeal at a time
when legislation to punish attempt was still in the future."' However, they
were not too eager to abandon their old doctrines to which they had be-
come sentimentally attached. This principle was limited, therefore, to
treason; in all other cases, a completed conduct was required. Coke in his
discourses on treason shows that compassing and imagining the king's
death was penalized, and he refers to the two cases abstracted by Fitz-
herbert.1' 1 As a negative reaction to the dangers implied in this rule at the
rise of greater tolerance in the realm of thought, English law adopted
strict probative requirements in the prosecution of treason.
This modest innovation, however, the moment it became accepted, pro-
vided a foothold for wider extension of the doctrine; it focused the impor-
tant role of intention in the determination of a felony. In 1466, for in-
9S. 3 Holdsworth 373.
99. See 2 Stephen, The History of the Criminal Law of England 222 n.1 (I3) (quoting
Fitzherbert, Corone 3S3 (15 Edw. II 1322)); see also cases cited in 3 Holdsworth 373 n.4.
100. 3 Holdsworth 372-73.
101. Coke, Third Institute 5 (1797); 3 Holdsworth 373. These cases are reproduced in
2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 99, at 222 n.1.
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stance, a case 10 2 of trespass arose where the defendant asked for absolution
from liability because the damage alleged came about against his will. De-
fendant owned an adjoining land with a thorn hedge. In cutting the thorns,
some fell upon the plaintiff's land against his will (ipso invito). He entered
upon plaintiff's land to take them, and trespass was charged. Some inter-
esting exchanges of counsel were recorded.
Catesby, for the defendant, argued:
And, sir, I put a case that I am cutting my trees, and the boughs fall upon a man
and kill him; in this case I shall not be attainted as of felony, for my cutting was
lawful, and the falling upon the man was against my will, and no more here, etc.
To this Fairfax, for the plaintiff, answered:
It seems to me just the other way; and I say that there is a diversity between an
act resulting in a felony and one resulting in trespass, for in the case put by Catesby
there was no felony, for felony is of malice prepense, and when it was against his
will, it was not anino felonico, etc.; but if one is cutting trees, and the boughs fall
on a man and wound him, in this case he shall have an action of trespass, etc.; and,
also, sir, if one is shooting at butts, and his bow shakes in his hands, and kills a man,
ipso invito, it is no felony, as has been said, etc.; but if he wounds one by shooting,
he shall have a good action of trespass against him, and yet the shooting was lawful,
etc., and the wrong which the other received was against his will, etc. and so hero,
etc.
10 3
Some forty years later, we find, in the Year Books, Judge Rede using in
a trespass case'0 4 the arguments of Fairfax. He affirms that in trespass
"the intent cannot be construed; but in felony it shall be." Pursuing anal-
ogies, he referred to a man who shoots at butts and kills a man, or of a
tiler on a house killing a man unwittingly with a stone. In both cases, Rede
believes, it is not felony. However, he was careful to add that "when a man
shoots at the butts and wounds a man, though it is against his will, he shall
be called a trespasser against his intent."'0 ° Criminal wrong is being grad-
ually isolated from civil wrong, and "intention" was the criterion
adopted. 0 6 Sir Thomas Raymond, almost repeating the thoughts of Lit-
tleton, indicates to us the rationale of this rule: ."In all civil acts the law
102. Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 4, f. 7, pl. 17 (1466).
103. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 990 (1932). Judgment was for the plaintiff.
Ibid. See also Holmes, op. cit. supra note 89, at 85-87.
104. Y.B. Trin. 21 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 5 (1506).
105. Ibid. See discussion of this case and other later shooting cases in Holmes, op. cit.
supra note 89, at 87-88.
106. For larceny, see the famous Carrier's Case, Y.B. Pasch. 13 Edw. 4, f. 9, pl. 5
(1473); for mayhem, Y.B. Hil. 13 Hen. 7, f. 14, pl. 5 (1498), translated in Sayre, Cases
on Criminal Law 925, 265 respectively (1927) ; see also Sayre, supra note 103, at 990-91.
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doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of
the party suffering."0 7
After these statements in the Year Book generalizing "evil intent" as
the distinctive element of felony, to support it became commonplace in
criminal law. It was accepted and has found little refinement in the legal
treatises of Staunford,105 Coke,103 Hale °10 and Hawkins."' By the second
half of the seventeenth century, it was already universally accepted in En-
gland that this so-called "evil intent" was a necessary element of an of-
fense.112
The position of negligence, however, was wholly different. As a mental
attitude, it does not possess positive evidences of its nature; the untrained
mind would not find the objective elements of a crime useful in the artic-
ulation of some general propositions. A conception of some standard of
care must be found, and this is primarily an approximation of an ideal be-
haviour in a particular situation. To construct this ideal and abstract con-
cept requires a sensitive perception and evaluation of the attendant cir-
cumstances; for example, the personal qualifications of the actor, the time
and place of the occurrence, and the like. Hence, the standard of care, and
necessarily negligence, as an omission of the standard of care, are deter-
mined by factual variables, and thus limited to the attendant circumstances
of a particular conduct. For this reason, a strong barrier stood in the way
to generalize negligence. The English lawyers and judges at this time were
unsure, and there was a considerable hesitation to consider any attitude
short of "intent" as sufficient to qualify a conduct an offense.
During the Anglo-Saxon era, when no defensible theory of liability ex-
isted, it was really purposeless to distinguish intention and negligence. In
either case, and even in misadventure, the liability was the same when a
corporeal injury existed; and we saw that no concept of negligence and in-
tention was known. We have seen, however, that Glanville attempted to
contrast dolus and czdpa. Apparently, not much of his discussion was use-
ful as a basis for the development of the theory of negligence. After all, his
account of the criminal law is contained in few pages, and treats almost ex-
clusively matters of procedure. 3 Passing to the time of Bracton, there
was little to see in the treatment of negligent liability, at least, in the royal
107. Bessey v. Olliot & Lambert, T. Raym. 467 (16S2), quoted in Holmec, op. cit.
supra note 89, at SS.
10S. Staunford, Pleas of the Crown 27 (1557).
109. Coke, op. it. supra note 101, at 45-47, 69, 161.
110. 1 Hale, op. it. supra note 93, at 425-26, 532.
111. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 72 (Sth ed. 1824).
112. Sayre, supra note 103, at 993.
113. 2 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 99, at 197.
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courts." 4 Even in the lords' courts, except for some references to straying
cattle, goring oxen, biting dogs and fire, there is no encouraging evidence
of a medieval law of negligence." 5 As Maitland remarks, "Hardly a germ
is to be found of any idea which will answer to the Roman culpa or become
our modern negligence.""' 6 In torts, not until the nineteenth century is
there a principle comparable to the modern tort negligence found in the
books.1 1 7 "This may seem a breathless course; but till then the history of
negligence is a skein of threads, most of which are fairly distinct, and no
matter where we cut the skein we shall get little more than a bundle of
frayed ends. '"" 8 In continental Europe, however, the Sachsenspiegel seems
to indicate that in the thirteenth century some form of doctrine of negli-
gence was already conceived. Although intentional conducts, as in England
at this time, were within the coverage of criminal law, the law of the mid-
dle ages in the continent distinguishes misadventure and negligence in
tortious behaviours (unerlaubte Handlungen). The law in Saxony accord-
ing to the Sachsenspiegel was that "one should pay the damage which
arose to other persons because of his negligence [Fahrldssigkeit], as
when the damage come about from fire or well which he failed to fence
a knee above the ground, or when he shoots or throws at a man or cattle,
when he aims at a bird.""19
In 1681, the reluctance to hold negligence, however gross, was still en-
tertained. In Lambert v. Bessey, 20 a trespass for false imprisonment, the
defendant justified on a bad writ. It was, however, held that:
In all civil acts the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss
and damage of the party suffering .... And the reason of all these cases is, because
he that is damaged ought to be recompensed. But otherwise it is in criminal cases,
for there actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.'21
If death results in a conduct by negligence, it was a misadventure or ac-
cident in which pardon was of due course, and no criminal liability could
arise. To Hale, this theory of criminal liability revolves upon the "consent
114. For a detailed study, see Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts,
42 L.Q. Rev. 184 (1926). Winfield points out that of the 256 select civil cases between
1200-1203 in the Selden Society collection, no principle similar to negligence can be found.
Id. at 184 n.3.
115. 2 Pollock & Maitland 527-28.
116. Id. at 528.
117. Winfield, supra note 114, at 185.
118. Ibid.
119. Sachsenspiegel, Landrecht 38 (Eckhardt ed. 1955). (Writer's transl.)
120. T. Raym. 421, 83 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1681). This is abstracted in Wigmore,
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, Appendix at 458
(1894). He also abstracted other cases on the same line of thought. Id. at 456-64. See
generally 3 Holdsworth 375-79.
121. T. Raym. at 422-23, 83 Eng. Rep. at 221.
(Vol. 33
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
of the will" because it is the will which renders human action commendable
or culpable. 122 If there is no will to commit an offense, Hale believes,
"there can be no transgression, or just reason to incur the penalty.""2
Using the same reasoning, he developed a limitation upon the imposition
of the death penalty:
[I]f the act, that is committed, be simply casual, and per in!ortunum, regularly
that act, which, were it done ex andmi intentione, were punishable with death, is not
by the laws of England to undergo that punishment; for it is the will and intention,
that regularly is required, as well as the act, and event, to make the offense capital. 24
Starting from one extreme-liability for all consequences causally re-
alized-the English law leaped to the other extreme-liability for conse-
quences intentionally brought about. Undesirable consequences realized
through other states of mind were excluded. A large area of culpable
wrongs were therefore excluded from the more effective and swift sanction
of penalty. The English law has posited misadventure as the antithesis of
intention, but misadventure was too broadly construed. Gradually, how-
ever, the legal minds realized that a limitation of "misadventure" must be
invented. There were two available techniques to restrict "misadventure":
either defining "intention" broadly, so that some of the culpable wrongs
within "misadventure" could be qualified as intentionally committed; or
develop a concept which, although not completely satisfying the restrictive
meaning of intention, must, somehow, entail the consequence of liability
arising from a felony. The former technique was no longer possible to fol-
low; common law was well committed to the restrictive doctrine of inten-
tion and it was difficult to overthrow all the cases abruptly. The second
technique offered more possibilities, and apparently it has the support of
Bracton. With it, it was possible to apply the doctrine of versari in re ilicita
and the articulation of a concept of negligence. Coke's thinking has taken
the cue. He was sure about his position when he developed the construc-
tive malice doctrine, but he had merely a vague insight of the possibility
of articulating negligence. He probably did not clearly see the different
implications of the two concepts. He nevertheless contrasted misadventure
with intent. "Homicide by misadventure," says Coke, "is when a man doth
an act, that is not unlawfull, which without any" evill intent tendeth to a
man's death.' 2- If the act is unlawful, Coke will hold the actor liable for
murder, the factual absence of intent being irrelevant 20 Coke did not see
122. 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 93, at 14-15.
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id. at 3S.
125. Coke, op. cit. supra note 101, at 56.
126. Ibid. "If the act, be unlawful, it is murder. As if A, meaning to steale a Deer in the
Park of B, shooteth at the Deer, and by the glance of the arrow hilleth a boy, that iL hid-
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that in negligence the central notion is the standard of care deduced from
the circumstances of each case. If such circumstances are present which
would merely delimit the ideal behaviour, Coke would have immediately
found the application of the constructive malice doctrine. In Coke's ex-
ample, that the man knows that many people came in the street from a ser-
mon, does not indicate anything relevant. This knowledge merely forms
the basis of the resolution of his action. We cannot derive a conclusion of
any intent or negligence. Coke elaborates the example by supposing the
man to have thrown a stone over the wall and someone is killed. We still
cannot conclude negligence or intention even with this additional fact. We
must find the content of the actor's resolution and the causal potentiality
of the actor's conduct. Coke, however, with this additional fact, arrives at
a vague and confused but valid insight. Somehow he believes that the con-
tent of the actor's resolution is relevant, although his conclusion to hold it
murder is harsh. If the man "[intends] only to feare them, or to give them
a light hurt" Coke calls it murder, "for he had an ill intent, though that in-
den in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was unlawful], although A had no intent to
hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B the owner of the Park had shot at his own
Deer, and without any ill intent had killed the Boy by the glance of his arrow, this had
been Homicide by misadventure, and no felony.
"So if one shoot at any wild fowle upon a tree, and the arrow kilieth any reasonable
creature afar off, without any evil intent in him, this is per infortunium: for it was not
unlawfull to shoot at the wilde fowle: but if he had shot at a Cock or Hen, or any tame
fowle of another mans, and the arrow by mischance had killed a man, this had been murder,
for the act was unlawfull." Stephen says that "a more disorderly mind than Coke's and one
less gifted with the power of analysing common words it would be impossible to find." 2
Stephen, op. cit. supra note 99, at 206. However, he also says that this "astonishing doc-
trine" as it has been modified by Foster who limits the unlawful act amounting to felony
"has been repeated so often that I amongst others have not only accepted it, though with
regret, but have acted upon it." 3 id. at 57. Stephen doubts the authorities given by Coke,
including that of Bracton, who, of course, did not consider it murder as Coke does. Id. at
57-58.
Hobbes criticizes Coke on this point: "Philosopher: This is not so distinguished by any
statute, but is the common-law only of Sir Edward Coke. I believe not a word of It. If a
boy be robbing an appletree, and falleth thence upon a man that stands under it and breaks
his neck, but by the same chance saveth his own life, Sir Edward Coke, it seems, will have
him hanged for it, as if he had fallen of prepensed malice. All that can be called crime In
this business is but a simple trespass, to the damage perhaps of sixpence or a shilling. I
confess the trespass was an offence against the law, but the falling was none, nor was it by
the trespass but by the falling that the man was slain; and as he ought to be quit of the
killing, so he ought to make restitution for the trespass. But I believe the cause of Sir
Edward Coke's mistake was his not well understanding of Bracton, whom he cites In the
margin." Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws
of England, in 6 The English Works of Thomas Hobbes 87 (Molesworth ed. 1840).
(Emphasis omitted.)
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tent extended not to death, and though he knew not the party slaine2' T2
In his rationale of the forfeiture following a misadventure, he seems to
suggest already the actor's legal duty to direct his conduct in a way so that
unintended harms will not be realized:
For the killing of any by misadventure, or by chance, albeit it be not felony, qda
voluntas in delictis, non exitus spectator; yet he shall forfeit therefore all his goods
and chattels, to the intent that men should be wary so to direct their actions, as they
tend not to the effusion of man's blood.'2 8
The necessity to fashion some form of limitation upon misadventure
independent of the constructive malice rule came directly in question in
the Hull case of 1664.129 The defendant, indicted for murder, was a worker
building with others a house which stood about thirty feet from the high-
way. He was sent to bring down a piece of timber from the second floor.
He shouted, "Stand clear," and threw over the timber which struck and
killed a co-worker. This was held misadventure, and ambiguous statements
generalizing the standard care in negligent behaviours were made. It was
pointed out that because the workman did what was usual for workmen
to do, namely, to shout "Stand clear," he cannot be held for a felony. It
was also felt that this right and usual conduct is not an absolute concept
but a concept definable from the varying circumstances of each situation.
It was remarked that although the conduct of the defendant was satis-
factory in that particular place, it might be a basis of liability if it were
done in London, so that in spite of the warning, the act would have been
manslaughter.
Hale apparently picked up the suggestion in this case. In discussing a
homicide per infortunium, he summarizes the doctrines to which we have
already made reference. He mentions the hypothetical situation of a car-
penter or mason in a building letting fall a piece of timber or stone, and
killing another. He finds a homicide per infortunhm.2 He was, however,
quick to qualify that if the carpenter or mason "voluntarily let it fall,
whereby it kills another, if he gives no due warning to those under, it will
be at least manslaughter; quia debitam diligentiam non adhibuit."2'
But it was only in the work of Foster that some form of rational doctrine
127. Coke, op. cit. supra note 101, at 56.
128. Ibid.
129. Kelyng 40, 34 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1664). For comments on this case, se, Moreland,
Rationale of Criminal Negligence 4 (1944); Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 122-
23 (2d ed. 1960); Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis foe Liability in Criminal
Homicide Cases, 26 Ky. L.J. 209, 216 (193S).
130. 1 Hale, op. cit. supra note 93, at 56.
131. Ibid,
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of negligence in criminal liability is achieved in English law. 8 2 Foster for
the first time saw the significance of the standard of care or diligence in
the theory of negligence. He definitely characterized the central idea of
negligence as the "lack of caution or due care to prevent danger." 83 He
did not hastily conclude, as Coke did, that a death becomes murder if the
actor knows circumstances which would forewarn him of the possible
bringing about of harm. Rather, he attempted to distinguish three situa-
tions, all based on different mental attitudes, which are, however, not ab-
solutely without obscurity. He puts up the example of a man driving a
cart or carriage who happens to kill another. He urges that murder is com-
mitted if the man "saw or had timely notice of the mischief likely to ensue
and yet drove on," because here "it was wilfully done."' 34 One degree re-
moved from murder because of "wilfullness" is manslaughter due to neg-
ligence. This would be the case "If he might have seen the danger, but did
not look before him" because the facts show that he acted with "want of
circumspection."'1 5 In other words, the actor failed to observe due care,
and this omission of the "due care" is to be imputed to the driver. How-
ever, if the accident happened in such circumstances that no want of due
care will be imputed to the driver, then Foster thinks "it will be accidental
death, and the driver will be excused." 30 Foster, therefore, clearly per-
ceived that the distinction between negligence and misadventure can be
found in the actor's relation to the due care.'37 Negligence is simply omis-
sion of the due care, whereas accident presupposes observance of the re-
quired care. Foster, however, did not elaborate how "due care" should be
defined or formulated.
Upon the establishment of negligence as a psychical basis of liability,
the mind of man became totally open to conceptual analysis. 3 8 Intention
132. Foster, Crown Law (2d ed. 1791).
133. Id. at 258.
134. Id. at 263.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Foster made interesting observations on Hull especially the direction that If the
conduct in Hull were done in London, it would have been a manslaughter in spite of the
warning. Ibid.
138. In Blackstone, Foster's discourses were merely repeated and amplified: "[Wlhen a
workman flings down a stone or piece of timber into the street, and kills a man; this may
be either misadventure, manslaughter, or murder, according to the circumstances under which
the original act was done: if it were in a country village, where few passengers are, and
he calls out to all people to have a care, it is misadventure only; but if It were in London,
or other populous town, where people are continually passing, it is manslaughter, though
he gives loud warning; and murder, if he knows of their passing, and gives no warning at
all . . . ." 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *192.
[Vol. 33
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
and negligence are the foundations of liability based on mens rca as an
ethical concept. It presupposes blameworthiness in the realization of the
harmful consequence. The actor is blameworthy because he intentionally
or negligently brought about the harmful consequence. In 1891, Lord
Justice Bowen boldly swept away the timid abnegation of the earlier courts
to investigate the human mind, and found all the self-imposed helplessness
to visit the operations of the mind erroneous. In sharp contrast to the
words of Chief Justice Brian, three centuries earlier, he said:
So far from saying that you cannot look into a man's mind, you must look into it,
if you are going to find fraud against him; and unless you think you see vhat must
have been in his mind, you cannot find him guilty of fraud.130
V. THE TREN TowARD STRICT LIABmmITY
The complexity of the social structure that began to emerge since the
Industrial Revolution stimulated a new line of analysis in criminal law
and its philosophy. This was a development that found difficult and slow,
but voluminous, expression from the second half of the last century. The
machine brought with it enigmatic phenomena and processes that obscured
the causal relation of human conduct and harm. Whereas in simple soci-
ety the immediate position of conduct and harm was consistent with the
ascertainment of the hypothesis of liability justified on "fault," proof of
"fault" became difficult since the coming of the machine. The conduct was
suddenly removed further and further from the harm. The area of "guilty
knowledge" as a reference of the concept of fault turned nebulous; its
boundaries diffused among facts or circumstances that cannot be evalu-
ated otherwise than neutral. The dilemma that compelled the primitive
mind to surround itself with myths and symbols was slowly driving the
modem mind to invent fictitious doctrines and presumptions to facilitate
proof or which would ultimately abolish the requirements of proof.
In another sphere of social history, the individualism that prevailed in
criminal law before and during the nineteenth century was challenged seri-
ously by a collectivistic or socialistic philosophy.", The earlier premise in
the analysis of crime was the security of individual personality; to insulate
him from the injustice of the social order was its fundamental purpose.
Security was assured while the imposition of penal sanction is conditioned
upon personal guilt. On the other hand, a more extensive and effective reg-
ulation of social life was felt necessary as a result of the developing social
order. The security of social interest was gradually gaining emphasis
over the protection of individual freedom. The machinery of criminal
139. Angus v. Clifford, [1S911 2 Ch. 449, 471.
140. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 59, 67-70 (1933).
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law was reviewed to accommodate the new thought. A criminal law whose
fundamental presupposition is personal guilt cannot be appropriate to
realize the petty regulations relating to traffic, construction, sanitation,
foods, drinks and the like. "What is badly needed," Sayre noted, "is
some form of administrative control which will prove quick, objective
and comprehensive,"14' a technique which should be "unrelated to ques-
tions of personal guilt.' 1 42 It is urged that to devise this system of criminal
law, the only reliable indication of a wrong should be the realization of a
harmful conduct or consequence. The psychical foundation of the actor's
behaviour is unimportant and should be disregarded.
No doubt this abrupt change of fundamental assumption was influenced
by utilitarianism which became popular amongst jurists when analytical
jurisprudence was claiming success. 43 Typical along this line of thought
is Holmes' theory of objective liability." Holmes teaches that "Public
policy sacrifices the individual to the general good . ..and justice to the
individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of
the scales." 4 5 Holmes identifies penalty with pain and its only purpose is
to give to the actor a new motive for not doing the punishable act. If the
actor persists on doing the act, the law has to inflict the pain in order to be
believed. 46 Utilitarian ethics adopts a strongly objective premise in the
evaluation of human conduct. To postulate it as the foundation of criminal
liability leads to the articulation of crime in terms of its external circum-
stances; the undesirable consequence is the determinative element in the
ethical notion of crime. Holmes therefore urges that the law merely treats
the individual as a means to an end, and uses him merely as a tool to in-
crease the general welfare at his own expense. 147 The general welfare is de-
fined in terms of the outward order, the absence of an open and observable
injury to the material world. The reliable indications of the disturbance of
the general welfare are the objective circumstances. To achieve the end of
criminal law, all that it demands is external conformity to its commands.
141. Id. at 69.
142. Id. at 67.
143. As Pound noted utilitarianism, although a theory of ethics, is in reality a theory of
applied ethics. 1 Pound, Jurisprudence 79 (1959). Austin, the leader of the analytical school,
was a zealous disciple of Bentham, the forerunner of the analytical school and leader of
utilitarianism. Rudolf von Jhering, the German imperativist, was the founder of social
utilitarianism.
144. For discussion of Holmes' theory of objective liability, see Hall, General Principles
of Criminal Law 146-58 (2d ed. 1960); Binavince, The Theory of Negligent Offenses In
Anglo-American Criminal Law, 38 Phil. L.J. 428, 450-54 (1963).
145. Holmes, The Common Law 48-49 (1949); see also Holmes-Laski Letters 806
(Howe ed. 1953).
146. Holmes, op. cit. supra note 145, at 46.
147. Id. 46-47.
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"For the most part," says Holmes, "the purpose of the criminal law is only
to induce external conformity to rule. All law is directed to conditions
of things manifest to the senses ... ; its object is ...an external re-
sut.114S In robbery, for example, the purpose of the law is to put a stop to
"actual physical taking and keeping of other men's goods," and in murder,
"the actual poisoning, shooting, stabbing and otherwise putting to death
of other men. 114 9 If these harms are not done, the law forbidding them is
equally satisfied, whatever the motive. Conversely, if these are done, the
law prohibiting them is transgressed regardless of guilt. In Holmes's
theory, the element of mens rea is totally excluded. Indeed, all references
to the mind are abandoned. In the theory of objective liability, the state
of mind is "wholly unnecessary, and all reference to the state of his
[actor's] consciousness is misleading .... "I"
Further, the traditional concepts of criminal law such as "moral culpa-
bility," "mens rea," "fault," "intention" and "free will" were under violent
attack when the empirical method of natural science was transplanted in
criminal law. Darwin's study of man's origin disclosed that man is a part
of the natural universe to be studied, not as a spiritual or elevated being,
but as any other natural object. A new field of discipline emerged-the
science of criminology-which would undertake to find the causality of
criminality. Lombroso applied this method when he maintained that the
cause of crime might be traced to the retarded physical development of the
human specie; he began measuring the head, the ears and other physical
features of man. The Scuola Positiva openly proposed the abandonment of
the traditional concepts of criminal law. Ferri, for instance, rejected the
distinction of civil and criminal law, a distinction which is a corollary of
the traditional thought in legal liability. 1 ' There was also a remarkable
activity in the law of tort to limit the doctrine of "no liability without
fault," and the doctrine of strict liability was urged to be accommo-
dated.' - 2
The courts led in the recognition of the theory of strict liability in crim-
inal law." 3 Before the middle of the nineteenth century, there was still a
lack of unequivocal evidence that the courts would not strictly adhere to
14S. Id. at 49.
149. Ibid.
150. Id. at 75.
151. See Ferri, Criminal Sociology 413 (1917).
152. See Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951); Hall, General Principles of
Criminal Law 331 (2d ed. 1960); McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence ObZolete?,
26 St. John's L. Rev. 255 (1952); Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modem Civil
and Common Law (pts. 1-2), 16 Ill. L. Rev. 163, 263 (1921), (pts. 3-4), 17 Ml. L. Rev.
187, 416 (1922-1923).
153. Legislative intervention is relatively recent, and was mainly directed to the ordering
of the modem economy.
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the rule that even in minor offenses mens rea was a necessary element of
liability.'54 In 1846, however, Regina v. Woodrow 5' signalled the recog-
nition of the doctrine of strict liability in England. A tobacco dealer was
charged with having in his possession adulterated tobacco which he pur-
chased as unadulterated. Although he did not know, nor had reason to sus-
pect the tobacco was adulterated, the defendant was held liable. To Chief
Baron Pollock, the fact that the defendant knew he was in possession of
the tobacco was sufficient. He considers it not necessary that the defendant
knows the tobacco to be adulterated.156 It being remarked that to gain the
knowledge of adulteration it was necessary to make a "nice chemical anal-
ysis," he retorted that "you must get someone to make that nice chemical
analysis."'15 7 It should be noted that the reasoning was to rebut the defense
of absence of guilty knowledge, and the effects of these statements was to
make possession alone determinative of liability. Baron Parke admits that
the logical consequence of this doctrine "may produce mischief, because
an innocent man may suffer from his want of care in not examining the
tobacco he has received . . . ." However, Baron Parke seized the diffi-
culty of proof of "guilty knowledge" to justify liability in such cases. He
argued that "the public inconvenience would be much greater, if in every
case the officers were obliged to prove knowledge. They would be very
seldom able to do so.""' Some twenty years later, this ruling was reiter-
ated and further elaborated in a nuisance case. 50 An additional argument
was advanced to support the doctrine. It was observed that although the
nature of the proceedings in which strict liability could be imposed is crim-
154. Sayre, supra note 140, at 56; Harno, Some Significant Developments in Criminal
Law and Procedure in the Last Century, 42 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 427, 430-31 (1951). A
similar problem has been encountered in Germany in the so-called Ordnungsstrafrecht which
includes administrative criminal law (Verwaltungsstrafrecht), commercial criminal law
(Wirtschaftsstrafrecht), and police regulations. In general, the blameworthiness of conduct
is required as an element of the offense. It has been said that these behaviours violate merely
the imperative determination of the norm (Bestimmungsnorm) not the evaluation of the
norm directed to the consequence (Bewertungsnorm). The German system is actually ex-
plaining the absence of a harm though there is guilt and therefore liability. The problem In
Anglo-American criminal law is the determination of liability in the absence of guilt. For
a discussion of the German position, see Goldschmidt, Das Verwaltungsstrafrecht (1902);
Kaufmann, Das Unrechtsbewusstsein 183-96 (1949); E. Schmidt, Probleme des Wirt-
schaftsstrafrechts, Siiddeutsche Juristen Zeitung 225 (1948); Erik Wolf, Die Stellung der
Verwaltungsdelikte im Strefrechtssystem, 2 Festgabe fUr Reinhard von Frank 516 (1930).
155. 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (Ex. 1846).
156. Id. at 415, 153 Eng. Rep. at 912.
157. Id. at 413, 153 Eng. Rep. at 911.
158. Id. at 417, 153 Eng. Rep. at 913. Sayre summarizes a number of decisions deviating
from this ruling. See Sayre, supra note 140, at 58 n.10.
159. The Queen v. Stephens, 118661 1 Q.B. 702.
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inal, it was only so in form; in substance, however, it is a civil action in
which no mens rea is required."' Other subsequent cases made the doctrine
applicable in the construction of statutes regulating foods10' and traffic.Y2
In the United States, Connecticut led in the introduction of the doctrine.
Apparently without awareness of the English decision, the court in Barnes
v. State6 3 held that a conviction for the sale of liquor to a common drunk-
ard may be obtained even if the seller did not know that the buyer was a
drunkard. The wide acceptance of the doctrine in the United States, how-
ever, is attributable to the Massachusetts court. In Commonwealth v. Far-
ren,"'4 the defendant was convicted under a Massachusetts statute regu-
lating adulterated milk, although he sold the milk without knowing it to be
adulterated. The court relied heavily upon the words of the statute to dis-
regard the classical requirements of fault. It argued, along the same line as
Baron Parke, that the difficulty of proof of knowledge in this case justifies
the conviction. Utilitarian arguments were further used to demonstrate the
desirability of holding the defendant "absolutely liable." The interest of
the community to be protected from adulterated foods, the court believes,
is significant, and to shift the burden of inconvenience to the dealer's
shoulder is reasonable. 6 After 1868 the doctrine became well established
in other states. 6 From this limited catalogue of offenses, it expanded in
the construction of statutes regulating the sale of narcotics, bigamy, adul-
tery, statutory rape, possession or transportation of gambling devices,
traffic construction and zoning, and a great miscellany which permits no
organized classification.
The Supreme Court has also adopted the theory of strict liability in the
construction of federal legislation. The Court believes that the same pres-
sure that compelled the states to adopt legislation without reference to the
requirement of guilt has exerted influence upon Congress to adopt legisla-
tion, especially in regulating interstate commerce, which must be inter-
preted to exclude proof of guilt for liability. In passing similiar legislation,
Congress must be presumed, according to the Court, to have borrowed the
"terms of art" which have been developed by the judicial decisions of the
160. Id. at 708-710 (Mellor, .).
161. See cases cited in Sayre, supra note 140, at 60 n.1S.
162. Id. at 61; see also Edwards, Mens Rea in Statutory Offenses (1955), for an ex-
tensive study of the English development.
163. 19 Conn. 397 (1849).
164. 91 Mass. (9 -Allen) 4S9 (1S64).
165. See also Commonwealth v. Raymond, 97 Alass. 567 (IS67i; Commonwealth v.
Goodman, 97 Mass. 117 (1367) ; Commonwealth v. Boynton, S4 Mass. (2 Alien) 1C0 (1361)
(cited by the court in Commonwealth v. Farren, supra note 164).
166. Sayre, supra note 140, at 66.
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
state courts in interpreting statutes similar to the federal law, together
with the "cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word."'"
From Mr. Justice Frankfurter's rationale for the theory of strict liability,
utilitarianism seems to be particularly significant in the rapid acceptance
of the theory in federal courts:
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transac-
tion though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing relative hard-
ships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity
of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of
consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the
innocent public who are wholly helpless.' 68
In this area of criminal law, we may observe that generally the doctrine
of mens rea was decidedly repudiated, and replaced by the theory of ab-
solute liability.169 Honest mistake of fact, however reasonable, is not rec-
ognized as a defense. 70 However, the interpretation of these statutes has
actually proceeded in many, sometimes inconsistent, directions. It has
been maintained that each individual offense must be investigated without
regard to earlier decisions concerning the same or analogous offense
penalized under the same or another statute. Frequently, some courts
hold that the legislative prohibition of "doing the act" defined in the
statute is "absolute," and the "doing of the act itself" supplies the required
mens rea. Apparently, the courts are confusing volition as an element of
the act isolated from the consequence which it may realize with mens rea.
This attempt to provide mens rea of some kind not related to the harm has
been appropriately called nothing but "paying a lipservice" to the prin-
ciple of mens rea.Y7' When a voluntary conduct exists, as in Woodrow,
the courts are quick to say that the mens rea requirement is thereby satis-
fied. In these instances, it seems to be implied that only circumstances
which would remove the voluntariness of the conduct, as coercion, neces-
sity and insanity, are available defenses. There are, however, rare cases in
which the courts still insist upon the requirement of mens rea in the inter-
pretation of these statutes. 7 2
Scholars are divided on the issues raised by the theory of strict liability,
167. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
168. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1943).
169. See Stallybrass, The Eclipse of Mens Rea, 52 L.Q. Rev. 60 (1936); Jackson,
Absolute Prohibition in Statutory Offences, 6 Cambridge L.J. 83 (1936).
170. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922); Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 168 (1889); Regina v. Prince, [18751
2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154.
171. Edwards, op. cit. supra note 162, at 244-47.
172. Id. at 248-51.
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with the majority rejecting it.'73 The discussion is concentrated on the de-
terrent effect of punishment in strict liability offenses, an issue which it is
not within the purpose of this article to analyze. Two points in this discus-
sion, however, are relevant. First, strict liability, it is said, approximates
"civil offense," or "public tort," and as such the penalty is usually fine in
minimal amount. 74 The liability, it is argued, is a form of civil liability
similar to the liability in public nuisance at common law. If this analogy is
granted, no valid generalization and systematization of criminal liability
can be formulated, for the position of strict liability confuses the essential
difference between criminal and civil sanction-a return to the confusion
of the theory of liability of the ancient criminal law. The second argument
supports strict liability on the basis of the old distinction between tnala
prohibita and mala in se.17c Blackstone's exposition is often taken as the
primary authority. Blackstone distinguishes mala in se from inala pro-
Iibita in that the former are intrinsic wrongs, whereas the latter are
simple "disobedience to the supreme power.' 70 Mala prohibita, the equiv-
alent of strict liability offenses, are offenses without personal guilt. This
distinction savors of natural law arguments. The "law of nature" or the
"law of conscience" defines wzala in se; mala prohibita, on the other hand,
are declarations of positive law. These statements suggest that criminal
law has two distinct sources, and that two ethical postulates, namely, the
ethics of conscience and the ethics of positive legislation, are accommo-
dated in the criminal law. The Nuremberg prosecutions notwithstanding,
criminal law has only one source; criminal law is only a positive law of
crime. To hold otherwise would mean the repudiation of the principle of
legality. Within this principle, the common-law criminal law is a positive
law, although the conscience of the judges may have been its primary
173. For criticism of the theory see, Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, ch. X
(2d ed. 1960); Williams, Criminal Law 255-61 (2d ed. 1961); Model Penal Code § 2.09,
comment 140 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Sayre, supra note 140, at 55; Hart, The Aims
of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401 (195S); Mueller, On Common Iaw
Mlens Rea, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 1043 (1953). See the defense of this doctrine by Friedmann,
Law in a Changing Society 199 (1959); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law,
12 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (1960).
174. See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 336-37 (2d ed. 1960); Per'ins,
Criminal Law 701 (1957); Gausevitz, Criminal Law-Reclasfffication of Certain Offewszs
as Civil Instead of Criminal, 12 Wis. L. Rev. 365 (1937); Perkdns, The Civil Offene 100 U.
Pa. L. Rev. S32 (1952).
175. Mlorissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) ; United Statez v. Balint, 253 US.
250 (1922); The Queen v. Tolson, E1SS9] 23 Q.B.D. 16S; Regina v. Prince, [1875] 2 Cr.
Cas. Res. 154; Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 337-42 (2d ed. 190); Perkdns,
Criminal Law 692 (1957).
176. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries **42, 55-58.
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inspiration. It is relevant to remark that the failure to comprehend that
the common-law criminal law is a positive law and not a "law of con-
science" has already misled European criminal-law scholars to claim
that the guarantee of the principle of nulla poena sine lege does not exist
in the common-law criminal law. To insist on the distinction of mala in se
and mala prohibita seems to give credence to this unfounded criticism.
The bifurcation of ethics in criminal law is less persuasive. Criminal law
embodies the ethical conceptions of the legal order;. a crime is a crime
not because it is a wrong to the conscience, but because it is wrong to
the legal order. Mala in se and mala prohibita are, in substance and form,
wrongs "to the supreme authority."
VI. CONCLUSION
The major problem of criminal law theory is the determination of the
basic ethical principle in reference to which the fundamental element of
crime should be defined. The history of criminal law, like the growth of
our moral consciousness, shows two relevant postulates in characterizing
crime, either in reference to the external conduct and its material conse-
quence, or the subjective elements that control or direct the conduct. This
study reveals the difficult experiments to find a desirable solution, but we
have not gone further than moving in a circle. The problem remains real
in modern criminal law.
We cannot doubt that the external alterations caused by conduct are es-
sential in our judgment of crime, since it is axiomatic that criminal law is
primarily conceived to protect the significant rights of individuals and so-
ciety. Criminal law is not intended to dictate the purity of our thoughts,
but to discourage us from committing a material wrong.177 The punish-
ment of witchcraft, or the imagining of the king's death as treason reminds
us of the tyranny of the days when criminal sanction has visited the inner
processes of our thought. Others have further urged the rejection of this
principle because to refer the definition of crime exclusively to the inno-
cence of the actor might "encourage ignorance where the law-maker has
determined to make men know and obey . ..." This discomfort is not
wholly unjustified. Crime must be something more than a wrong against
the conscience, otherwise the purpose of a legal order will be seriously
weakened. Imagine, for instance, the shattering effect on the legal order if
ignorance of the law were a universal defense, or better still, if a man could
177. Holmes says that the purpose of criminal law "is not to punish sins, but is to
prevent certain external results .... " Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20,
48 N.E. 770 (1897). See also Wiirtenberger, Die geistige Situation der deutschen Strafrcchts-
wissenschaft 50-51 (2d ed. 1959).
178. Holmes, op. cit. supra note 145, at 48.
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defend himself of robbery by alleging that to rob the rich is not in his con-
science wrong. On the other hand, we are disturbed by the equally undis-
puted truth that criminal liability is founded upon personal responsibility
for the harm. Responsibility is only real if the basic subjective element of
conduct is a fundamental premise of evaluation. We note that to pursue
the first principle to its logical extreme would abolish all guarantee of secu-
rity rooted in the innate feeling of innocence of the individual. Mistake,
however honest, would not be a defense. The theory of strict liability and
the felony-murder rule convince us that this principle is not desirable.
Max Weber has cogently expressed the issue in this problem in the anti-
thesis of Gesinnungsetlzik (ethics of conscience) and Vcrantwortung-
sethik (ethics of responsibilty) in law.l70 This issue has been encountered
also in moral science,/80 and scholars have searched for a solution from the
declaration of the Ten Commandments through St. Thomas Aquinas's'
and Kan s2 to Max Scheler5 3 and Nicolai Hartmann.84 It is the same
issue that underlies the dispute of criminal law scholars in Germany
whether it is the Erolgszinwert (consequence-disvalue) or the Handhmngs-
unwert (conduct-disvalue) that is determinative in the Rcchtswidrigkit
(unlawfulness) of a crime.' 5
Perhaps we have been too busy stressing the independence of these
two principles that we are accustomed to making them mutually exclusive.
179. Weber, Politik als Beruf, Gesammelte Schriften 396-450 (1921). The word
"Gesinnungsethik" is translated by Kurt Wilk as "ethics of sentiment." Radbruch,
Legal Philosophy, in Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and Dabin 92 (Kurt Wlilk
transl. 1950). Gerth & Mills translated the words as "ethics of ultimate ends." Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology 77-78 (Gerth & Mills transl. 1946). Ryu and Silving in dis-
cussing the use of this word by Welzel in Akltuelle Strafrechtsprobleme ir Rahmen der
finalen Handlungslehre (1956) translated it as "ethics of attitude." Ryu & Silving, Error
Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, at 449 n.165 (1957). The word
"Gesinnung" is really difficult to translate. The English word "sentiment" has emotional
connotation, "attitude" is mainly psychological, while "ultimate ends" is very objective.
"Gecinnung" carries a moral significance, and "mind" would have been short expre-ing this.
I have taken "conscience" although books would take "conscience" as the equivalent of
"Gewissen." ,
ISO. In ethics it is expressed in the form of Gesinnungethik and Erfolgcethil: (ethics
of consequence). See Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiele Wertethik
109-62 (1921).
181. Wittmann, Die Ethik des heiligen Thomas von Aquin (1933).
182. Kant, Grundlegung zur Mletaphysik der Sitten (1735).
183. Scheler, op. cit. supra note 10.
184. Hartmann, Ethik (1932).
185. Baumann, Strafrecht, allgemeiner Tell ein Lehrhuch 11 (2d ed. 1961); Mfaurach,
Deutsches Strafrecht, allgemeiner Tell 179-SO (2d ed. 1958); Wezel, Das deutsche Strafrccbt,
eine systematische Darstellung 1-4, 56-57, 113-20 (7th ed. 1960); Wiirtenberger Die
geistige Situation der deutschen Strafrechtswissenschaft 50-52 (2d ed. 1959).
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We suddenly forget that a synthesis is possible, and indeed necessary.
Even Weber remarks that: "In so far as this is true, an ethic of con-
science and an ethic of responsibility are not absolute opposites but rather
complements, which only in unison constitute a genuine man .... ,,O
A synthesis is derived by allocating to the two principles their mutually
interacting functions in the criminal law system. First, it is necessary to
make some observations on the theoretical structure of criminal conduct.
Conduct is the material manifestation of a will activity and is basically
purposive.187 No conduct, at least not one which is intelligent and re-
sponsible, exists for its own sake. It is an agency of man to intervene in
the causal world to realize some resolved objective. It is creative and
destructive; it can bring about value or disvalue. The potentiality of
conduct to create or destroy is an element that gives to it significance to
other persons or to society. It can affect the accommodated values in
criminal law, such as life, property, liberty, honor and others. The propo-
sition that conduct has teleological direction toward a causal situation
assumes, in turn, a conscious premise. Every conduct is based on what
is known. Knowledge is not an end by itself; it is for the purpose of
doing.1'88 This knowledge is not limited to the appreciation of the circum-
stances of the place and time of action. It includes the accumulated
generalized idea about our world of experience. In fact, the appreciation
of the present particular experience would appear meaningless and dis-
connected if not referred to our reservoir of generalized ideas. For one
to poison another, he needs not only to have the sense appreciation of
a tablet inside a bottle; he must have also an abstract idea of a poison.
A generalized idea is therefore important, and even sufficient to be the
basis of a blameworthy conduct. For example, we punish A for impossible
attempt in trying to poison B although he mistakenly gave B a vitamin
pill.
All these propositions do not, however, justify a conclusion that the
essential character of crime is solely determined by the intrinsic quality
of the will as Kant preaches.' All that they prove is that the' subjective
element is relevant; we cannot conclude that the subjective element is
exclusively significant. But if Kant's teaching should be qualified,
neither could we wholly agree with the utilitarians that the harmful
186. Weber, op. cit. supra note 179, at 127.
187. Welzel, op. cit. supra note 185; Welzel, Das neue Bild des Strafrechtssystems I
(4th ed. 1961).
188. "The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action:
knowing is for the sake of doing." Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation 3 (1946).
189. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Rechtslehre 197-206 (1797).
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consequence is determinative. If conduct cannot be totally isolated from
the will, then conduct is not purely a causal or natural phenomenon whose
ethical content is only derivable from its external manifestation in the
world of experience. Not every consequence-disvalue caused by conduct
is attributable to the activity of the will. We know, for example, ex-
cusable accidents. Further, the absolute validity of this proposition is
definitely weakened by the concededly rational conception to punish
attempts, conspiracy and solicitation. On the contrary, punishment may
even follow although objectively no material injury but rather benefit
results from conduct. Witness our poisoning example. The intended
victim may have profited from the vitamin pill. To the skeptical we may
illustrate this in the following case: A attacks B unlawfully. B, having
previously decided to kill A and without knowledge of the unlawful ag-
gression by A, kills A. In other words, B's conduct was not for the pur-
pose of defense. Although B saved his life by committing murder, the
benefit of self-defense cannot be recognized.100 Self-defense can only be
recognized if the defendant acted for the purpose of defense.
From this structure of conduct, we must allocate the theoretical func-
tion of the harmful consequence and the subjective element in crime.
This can be done without difficulty if we remember that man is not only
an individual; he is also a social unit.10 1 Mlan's life is guided by two
ethical considerations, that of his person and that of society. Society's
ethical conception is something peculiar. It is not like Dickens' Christmas
Spirits that appear from nowhere. Like all social categories, it is essen-
tially derivative, and the individual's ethical insight is its source."' As
Herbert Spencer noted, society has no central or natural consciousness.
The legal order is the positive expression of social morality, and
criminal law contains a catalogue of the most elementary and funda-
mental notions of social morality. Every individual, at least theoretically,
knows the norms of criminal law; it is his responsibility to know them.
190. This is the prevailing rule in Germany. Mlaurach, op. cit. supra note 1.5; H. Mayer,
Strafrecht, allgemeiner Tell 204 (1953); Schinke-Schrbder, Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar 323
(10th ed. 1960); 2 von Hippel, Strafrecht 210 (1930); Welzel, op. cit. supra note 18S.
235-36 (1949). He changed his position later in accordance with the prevailing vier. Mezger,
The position of Mezger was originally contrary. Mlezger, Strafrecht; cin Lehrbuch
Strafrecht, allgemeiner Tell 113 (Juristische KurzlehrbUcher 9th ed. 1960). In the United
States a similar view is represented by Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal
Law, 26 Yale LJ. 645 (1917). Hall takes the contrary view. General Principles of Criminal
Law 83 (2d ed. 1960). He claims support from Golden v. Georgia, 25 Ga. 527 (1353).
191. Durkheim remarks: 'Tar from being simple, our inner life has a sort of double
center of gravity. There is, on the one hand, our individuality, and more ezpccially our
body which is its foundation; on the other, all which, in us, epresses something other
than ourselves." Quoted in Alpert, Emile Durkheim and his Sociology 205 (1939).
192. Lewis, Ground and Nature of Right 83 (1955).
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The existence and meaning of a norm of criminal law, like every fact, are
knowable. Every individual, so far as it is consistent with his personal
capacity to know, must ascertain the conduct commanded or prohibited
in criminal law. If he fails to determine the legal significance of his pro-
posed behaviour from all available evidence within his command, he
is ignorant but not innocent. Only when the actor is honestly convinced,
whether correctly or erroneously, that his behaviour agrees with the
norms of the legal order, is his conduct not blameworthy. 1 3 There is,
in other words, a blameworthy ignorance. It must be noted that the actor's
responsibility to determine the rightness of his conduct extends not simply
to an error in the logical process of knowing; it extends to all possible
sources of error.
We should not be concerned with the individual's responsibility to
know the norms of the legal order. Firstly, he is not liable for blameless
ignorance. Secondly, he has no difficulty in determining the norms of the
legal order, especially in criminal law. Invariably the individual's ethical
insight-as a source of society's-accommodates a more exhaustive cata-
logue of right conduct. For this reason, we find it usually safe to rely
upon our personal notion of right behaviour.
From what has been discussed, we may conclude that the consequence
of conduct is significant in criminal law as the objective point of orienta-
tion of the actor in the formulation of a proposed, or the execution of a
decided conduct. To the extent that the actor is obliged to know the
proscribed or prescribed conduct, the Verantwortungsethik is determina-
tive. The subjective element provides the rational basis of responsi-
bility of the actor in behaving in one way and not differently. The
Gesinnungsethik determines the blameworthiness of an objectively wrong
behaviour. The problem of error in which the collision of the two
principles is most apparent is resolved by punishing only a blameworthy
ignorance. Only a blameworthy ignorance is a responsible ignorance.
It is absurd to punish a person for an ignorance or mistake which he,
despite honest effort, could not have avoided.
193. "We are all subject to errors of deliberation and conclusion, and the best that any
of us can do is what he thinks is right at the time when decision of action is called for.
Whoever does that is blameless." Lewis, op. cit. supra note 192, at 51. At another place,
he says: "[Ain act is subjectively right if it conforms to the doer's conviction concerning
what consequences are likely to follow and their having that character which marks
them as justified to bring about." Id. at 56.
